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1. General Considerations  
 
 Together with the idea of God and Immortality, Freedom was one of the 
three fundamental topics of classical metaphysics and it still remains a philosophical 
and theological issue of maximum diversity. 
 There are various approaches regarding freedom that defend the precedence 
of sociology over philosophy in the sense that it exists at the social level, not at the 
ideatic one; these approaches insist upon a sociology of freedom that questions its 
culturalizing approaches, being secluded from the so-called history of ideas and 
denying the absolute freedom and the Kantian transcendence of individual freedom. 
 Freedom is contextual: it is more an action than a state, an action 
conditioned by evolutional factual elements (from manumission – the act of freeing 
slaves – to the only exertion of freedom provided by the free market). 
 At the same time there are approaches related to the history of ideas – the 
so-called culturalizing approaches regarding freedom, such as those referring to 
individual transcendent freedom, moral freedom, absolute freedom, negative 
freedom, free will, positive freedom etc.; these approaches, by analyzing freedom in 
relation to a constraint system, see it as a(n) (almost) universal condition of 
humanity, but the free individual represents both a theoretical concept and a 
historical and social reality. 
 There are three arguments necessary to demonstrate the contribution of 
Greek thought to the theoretical development of modernity and late modernity: 
1. Conceptual freedom – the (philosophical, abstract) idea of freedom 
cannot be separated from its exertion (factual everyday freedom, which is expressed 
by constitutional practice during modernity and late modernity – freedom of 
consciousness, of manifestation and association) –  in the same way in which 
exerting freedom cannot set aside a conceptual frame either, regardless of its 
elaboration level; 
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The words “libertate = freedom” and  “liberal” find their common origins in the 
Latin word « liber »; 
2.  They had been used long before the moment of employing the term 
“liberal” in politics (certainly with different meanings from those acquired after the 
segregation of the Spanish assembly – from 1800 – when one of the groups was 
named Liberales); 
3. In order to support the title of the present study, in constructing the 
project of the free individual the theoretization of freedom starts from its Hellenic 
origins and in developing this project – factual freedom as a process – I started from 
P. Manent1 and Andrei Marga’s2 assumption that liberalism is a premise and a 
product of the modern era. 
 This assumption is taken into consideration in this study as an argument so 
as to demonstrate that: 
a) Theoretical foundations of liberalism transcend the modern era, 
especially by what we may call the construction and reconstruction of the idea of 
freedom, with all the consequences deriving from this idea; 
b) The concept of freedom has its own history which, only partially does 
it overlap the history of liberalism (in this case I am taking into account not only the 
governmental liberalism, but also liberalism as an ideological current, as a cultural 
platform). 
 Thus, I tried to avoid unilateralization. I did not find it appropriate either to 
assert that freedom is an exclusive component of liberalism in its political variant 
(constituted as an attempt to solve the theological and political problem – the 16th 
and 17th centuries – ) or to assert that freedom belongs exclusively to government 
liberalism (19th century – Kahan variant). On the contrary. Considering liberalism 
as a premise of the modern era, I attached myself to some famous authors (P. Manet, 
A. Marga) and the I sympathized with ideas expressed by J. Gray, Leo Strauss, Karl 
Popper (who had been speaking about pre-modern anticipations of liberalism, about 
its «germs» ever since Greek and Roman Antiquity) and I am trying now to 
reconsider the historical coordinate of the idea of freedom. 
 And if we can talk about germs of liberalism regarding the representatives 
of the Great Generation (sometimes even regarding Plato and Aristotle), we can also 
introduce not only the concept of freedom, but also the germs of its exertion during 
Antiquity. The difference between the way in which the free individual was 
                                                            
1   Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History Of Liberalism; Humanitas Publishing 
House, 1992; 
2   Andrei Marga, A Philosophy of European Union, Biblioteca Apostrof Publishing 
House, 2nd edition revised and enlarged, Cluj, 1997; 
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perceived during the prehistoric period of liberalism and the way in which it is 
perceived during the modern era is enormous. However, this enormous difference 
does not stand for incompatibility. 
 
2. The concept of freedom in Greek Antiquity 
 
 Nowadays the analysis of the idea of freedom (the philosophical, abstract 
foundation of freedom) cannot be detached from factual everyday freedom 
(respectively its constitutional exertion – the freedom of association, of 
consciousness and of manifestation), because the exertion of freedom has always 
implied a conceptual frame, a theoretical foundation of its own, and the exertion of 
freedom requires a complement of theoretizations. As a novelty, political life and 
political thought “only during the modern era are they directly and internally 
connected, existing the possibility of recounting the political history of Greece or 
Rome without making use of ideas or doctrines3. Recounting this story, Thucydides 
– the historian who describes and analyzes the Peloponnesian War, a full conflict 
manifestation of the Greek cities Athens and Sparta – finds that it “does not 
consecrate a single page to what we would call «intellectual life» or «cultural life»”. 
Moving forward: “Nowadays his history is still considered the masterpiece of Greek 
historiography, a part of historiography itself. This fact is even more remarkable 
because Greece, as we already know, is the cradle of philosophy, and especially of 
political philosophy. Plato and Aristotle started from the experience of Greek city 
life in elaborating their interpretations of human life, which constitutes the matrix of 
the entire subsequent philosophy. But these interpretations were developed after the 
conclusion of the great cycle of Greek politics. Totally different is the case of 
modern political philosophy. One may be tempted to say it was conceived before 
being put into practice. The skylark of liberalism flew away at dawn”4 
Starting from the analysis developed on the ancients’ conception about freedom in 
the 18th century by the warrantist Benjamin Constant, John Gray puts forward “the 
pre-modern anticipations of liberalism”5 and discovers the differences (sometimes 
extended to contradiction) between the conception upon freedom of the ancients and 
that of the moderns. Thus:   
¾ ancients identified freedom as being the same as the right to make decisions 
concerning community problems, whereas for the moderns freedom implies the 
                                                            
3  Pierre Manent, op. cit. p. 11 
4  Ibidem, p 11-12 
5  John Gray, Liberalism, Du Style Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 27 
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existence of an sphere secured from undesired disturbances as well as independence 
under law authority; 
¾ modern people associate freedom with the representation of privacy, while 
the ancients associated freedom with the possibility of representing options in the 
collective decisional system; 
¾ for the ancients the idea of freedom implied both individuals and 
communities, signifying autonomy (lack of control), whereas the moderns 
understand it as the field consecrated to the independence of the individual; 
¾ in a certain way, when it referred to individuals, freedom seldom meant 
“immunity against community control, being only the right to participate in its 
deliberations; the ancient conception of freedom is contradictory to that of the 
moderns”; 
John Gray adverts to the somewhat exaggerated character of B. Constant’s 
interpretation, who speaks about certain germs of liberal thought, germs existing in 
the ancient world, especially in the Greek thought. Thus, Gray insists upon the 
distinction made by sophists between natural and conventional, a distinction by 
which it is argued the universal equality of people. In this sense, he gives as 
example both Glaucon and Lycophron who are representative for the sophists 
distinction between human nature and human convention, so as to combat the 
conception regarding natural slavery.  
 “This – wrote Gray – is the case of Glaucoon, who in the second book of 
Plato’s Republic develops a theory of social contract, mainly of sophist origin. He 
says that justice represents a contract according to which one should neither commit 
nor endure injustice. Moreover, Aristotle mentions Sycophron as being advocate of 
the idea that the law and the state are based on a contract, so that the only mission of 
law is to provide the security of individuals, and that all the functions of the state are 
negative in the sense that they should prevent injustice”6. 
 Freedom is born within the continuous area between obedience and 
disobedience; Alcibiades, as the first private citizen, will hold the power of civic 
disobedience, and Alcidamos, considered the author of the assertion “the gods 
created all people to be free, nobody is a slave by nature”, puts forward to public the 
idea of equality by natural freedom. Therefore if people are born free (are equal by 
freedom), the issue of natural slavery has no value in agora. 
                                                            
6   Ibidem, p. 28 
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 Germs of liberal thought of the ancient world are also found in the group 
named by Karl Popper «The Great Generation», ranging from the schools of the 
sophists Protagoras and Gorcias, the atomist Democrit, the democrat Pericles – a 
generation that also included Alcidamos and Lycopfron. 
  Pericles’s Funeral Oration sets the foundation of this Generation that 
claimed its egalitarian-liberal and individualist principles and that existed in Athens 
during the Peloponnesian War. Therewith, Protagoras elaborated a theoretical 
foundation of participatory democracy (according to him all the people bring their 
contribution – sometimes unevenly – to providing justice), being the initiator of 
political equality doctrine in political history, doctrine developed at first as a 
criticism of the esoteric and elitist conceptions regarding the state (frequent in 
Greece)7. 
 The complexity of the problem of freedom and constraint, of democracy and 
freedom is also dealt with in the miniature (but famous) Democracy As Violence, 
attributed to the Athenian Anonymous (ca. 450 BC), representing the oldest 
criticism of democracy as a destructive and oppressive but perfect system8. But 
democracy, born as a rupture and not as a convenience word, expresses the 
prevalence of a certain part, not the equal participation of everybody, an equidistant 
participation in the city public life (the term insonomia would fit best to define it). 
For instance, Plato asserts that democracy is born as an act of violence “the moment 
that the poor conquer, killing some of the rich, hunting away some others. This 
violent instauration is achieved either by the power of weapons, or by excluding the 
antagonist who is forced to draw back by fear.” 9 Is not this idea prefigured by those 
expressed by A. Toqueville and J. St. Mill concerning the menace of the dictatorship 
of the majority? 
 In Gray’s opinion, Plato and Aristotle are against the germs of liberalism 
expressed by the representatives of the Great Generation. Thus, quoting E.A. 
Havelock and K. Popper, Gray writes: “In Plato and Aristotle’s works one will not 
discover a development of the conception of the Great Generation, but a reaction 
against it, an effeminacy of the Greek liberalism or a counterrevolution aimed at the 
open society in Pericles’s Athens”10. In this sense, he advocates that: 
                                                            
7   G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 144; 
8   Anonimo ateniese: La democrazia come violenza, Seleiro Editare, Palermo, 1982, 
p. 30; 
9   See Plato’s Republic, Book VIII, in Opera, V, Bucharest, Scientific and 
Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1986; 
10   J. Gray, op. cit. p. 29; 
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¾ the sophists and Democrit’s skeptic and empirical perspective is replaced by 
a «type of metaphysical rationalism» in Plato and Aristotle’s works; 
¾ Plato rejects the ethics of freedom and equality of the Great Generation 
philosophers «radically»; Aristotle proceeds in the same matter «more moderately, 
but not less substantially»; 
¾ In his Republic Plato disclaims a “veritable anti-liberal utopia”, denying 
«individualist requirements», rejecting moral equality of people, repudiating the 
criticism of institutions which, once established, become immutable. 
However, it has to be admitted that Plato, preoccupied with the 
consolidation of the Greek state facing the imminent danger of decadence, with the 
ideal state (as an absolute necessity and supreme achievement), threw into the 
background the signification of the intrinsic value of individual freedom. His 
approach regarding the elaboration of an organic theory of the state and the laws is a 
finalist one. At the same time it has to be also mentioned the fact that Plato’s work is 
not a homogeneous one and is not limited only to some dialogues and to the 
Republic. Consequently, the transfer from the sceptic and empirical point of view 
towards metaphysical rationalism that Gray mentions should be seen quite 
diffidently. For example we have in view that in his late works – especially in Laws, 
Plato displays an attempt to exhaustively prescribe the sphere of individual action 
under the form of some all-embracing laws that are able to guarantee the free actions 
of an individual, the constraint being limited to those actions that are not prescribed 
by law. 
Concerning Aristotle, Gray varies his position, even thoush he remarks the 
fact that the anti-liberal feeling is not “as virulent as the one that animates Plato’s 
works”, but “remains vigorous and incisive”11. In this sense, he finds that the 
majority of thinkers reached the conclusion that in Aristotle’s work there is no 
concession of individual freedom or human rights but their assumption that “any 
attempt to assign elements of the liberal conception to a pre-modern thinker is 
anachronic” is not embraced by Gray. The reason for which he rejects this point of 
view is represented by the obvious characteristics of individualism that are found in 
the sophists’ conception, characteristics that he denominated as “liberal thought 
germs in the ancient world”, previously referred to. This aspect is even more 
important as Alasdair MacIntyre affirms that “by the end of the Middle Ages in any 
ancient or mediaeval language there cannot be found any phrase that could be 
appropriately translated as designating what we commonly understand by «right». In 
                                                            
11   G.Gray, op. cit, p. 29; 
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Hebrew, Greek, Latin or in Japanese before the mid 19th century this concept lacks 
any possibility to be expressed”12. 
Leo Strauss contrasts the «classical natural right», regarding the adjectives 
of the phrase, with the modern conceptions regarding natural rights by taking into 
account the civic-private relation, thus advocating the civic duty as being the root of 
classical natural right and the illusion of civic duty in the modern theories referring 
to natural rights by illustrating the substantiation of individual freedom. With the 
moderns individual freedom is not only independent from civic responsibilities, but 
also prior in relation to them. This approach is acknowledged by J. Gray as well, and 
if the concept of civic duty is added the concept of touché, the Greeks’ approach 
becomes much more comprehensible. Besides, by fathoming the analysis of 
Aristotle’s work, in comparison to the sophists he was contemporary with, but also 
to Th. Bobbes and J. Lucke, Gray reaches the conclusion that “nowhere in his work 
is there any suggestion referring to the negative rights of individual freedom”, but 
the ethics of the Stagirite contains “under a rudimentary form, a certain conception 
upon the natural rights of man, that is of those rights that everyman owns by reason 
of their belonging to human species”13. 
 By reference to Nicomachic Ethics, Gray reinforces his arguments regarding 
the «rudimentary» character of the Aristotelic conception of the natural rights of 
man as universal rights based on human species belonging; he even finds a 
similarity between the assertion of natural rights in Aristotle’s work and Thomas 
Aquino’s conception regarding the foundation of these rights rooting in natural 
justice. “Indeed – he says – with Aristotle there is an almost functional conception 
of rights, where they appeared because of the different roles that individuals fulfilled 
within the polis. In Aristotle’s view, these functions were clearly attached to some 
extremely unequal rights, without even generating the right to non-interference or 
personal independence. Aristotle’s unalterable rejection of political equality has to 
be understood as being part of his conservatory reaction against the germinal 
liberalism in Athens”14. 
 
3.  The Democratic Ideal and Greek Antiquity 
 
I consider that it is not less interesting a short presentation of the Greeks’ 
conception about democracy, especially in order to illustrate, on the one hand, an 
                                                            
12   Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, p. 67 
13  J. Gray, op. cit. p.30 
14  Ibidem, pp. 30-31 
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eventual relation freedom – democratic ideal during the prehistory of liberalism, as 
well as the major differences between the significances of democracy in its incipient 
stages and liberal democracy, on the other. 
For the Greeks, democracy means common people’s governing, people who 
for the most part were poor, with no experience or solid education. The demos 
represented the majority group, the government of the city-state being realized for 
its own benefit in the first place, as opposed to aristocracy, which implied the 
government of aristoti («the best»), those about whom many Greek thinkers stated 
that they were the most suitable for governing. The decentralization of political life 
implied self-governance concerning the city-state (polis), and during the period of 
the Golden Age in Athens, its inhabitants considered the polis as being a democracy. 
“Our government form – said Pericles – does not rival with the institutions of other 
peoples. We are not imitating our neighbours, but we are an example to them. 
It is true that we are called democracy because the administration is in the 
hands of the many, not of the few. But whereas the law provides equal justice for 
everybody regarding their personal disputes, it is also acknowledged the demand to 
be the best; and when a citizen singularizes himself in one way or another, he is 
preferred for public functions not as a privilege, but as a reward for his merit. 
Poverty is not an obstacle, on the contrary, a man can bring benefits for his city-state 
[polis], no matter how obscure his condition may be”15. 
Pericles’s Funeral Oration suggests, apart from the distinction democrats-
aristocrats, another distinction of great importance for the Athenians, namely that 
one between the citizens interested in public affairs (polites) and the persons who 
only had an eye to the main chance (idiotes): “An Athenian citizen does not neglect 
the state, the «polis», because he cares for his own household; and even those fellow 
beings who are involved in business have a very good notion of politics. It is us 
alone who consider that a man who is not interested in public affairs is not a 
prejudicial character, but a useless one; and if few of our fellow beings initiate a 
politics, we all judge it thoroughly”16. 
The notion of citizenship includes a certain meaning of freedom; in order to 
be a citizen an individual had to be a free adult male Athenian. Athenian democracy 
does not include women, foreigners and slaves (consequently the majority of the 
population): only one out of ten inhabitants of Athens was a citizen (therefore free). 
Participating in public life implied:  
                                                            
15  Pericles, Funeral Oration, in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, vol. 
4, pp.127-128 
16  Ibidem, p.129 
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¾ the quality of major citizen of Athens; 
¾ the quality of free man, derived from the quality of citizen; 
¾ a public responsibilization that does not exclude the citizens involved in 
business (on the contrary, they are considered as having “a very good notion about 
politics”); 
¾ a remuneration of participation in political life, by which it was achieved the 
common interest shown by those involved (rich and poor) in participating in 
meetings and in deciding politics by direct vote; 
¾ filling political positions (a consequence of confiding in demos), not by vote 
but by drawing lots. 
Some of these characteristics, together with the reduced protection of 
minority rights, the limits of freedom of speech (under the circumstances of equality 
of all citizens before the law), ostracism practice (“ostrakon” – a shell or potsherd on 
which Athenian citizens wrote the names of those whom they wanted to eliminate 
without lawsuit and without bringing legal accusations), make Athenian democracy 
a highly limited form of government. Besides, Athens, the first democracy, created 
the first martyr of the freedom of thought and speech – Socrates. Regarding this fact 
as well as the discontentment related to the fact that democracy is an unstable form 
of government, and thus a dangerous one, Plato and Aristotle’s criticism is partially 
justified.  
Plato considered that by setting the political power in the hands of the 
ignorant and envy-tormented people, democracy is dangerous because: 
¾ the common people’s ignorance generates the impossibility to use political 
power for community welfare; 
¾ envy produces discriminations between promoting common welfare and 
one’s own welfare, the people tending to defend their own interests (personal 
welfare is favoured); 
¾ giving up common welfare in favour of personal welfare leads to robbing 
and plundering the wealthy; 
¾ ignorance and envy transform the demos into a manipulation tool for its 
leaders (by demagogy and adulation the leaders of the demos will speculate envy 
and will instigate people against each other); 
¾ warfare inside a city, specific to democracy, develops into civil war and 
anarchy, leading to the destruction of the city-state; 
¾ the anarchy generated by democracy will determine the people to demand 
“law” and “order” calling upon “power-solicitous persons” (and sufficiently 
powerful ones) who will govern by despotic measures (the tyrant is specified neither 
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the interests of the polis nor of the people, but only the power exerted on his own 
behalf).  
In essence, with Plato democracy, governing exerted by the people, is 
nothing more than a series of small steps towards despotism. 17 
Aristotle as well saw democracy as bad and undesirable. He asserts that this 
is one of the six main types of political regimes or constitutions. The power of  
governing, he writes in his Politics, has to be exerted by a person, a small group of 
persons or by a large group of people. This power is potentially exerted either for the 
welfare of the entire community – in which case it is «good», «true», or only for the 
welfare of the leaders – in which case it is «perverted». Taking the interest in 
exerting this power as a reference, Aristotle synthetizes that the power is exerted for 
the public interest in a monarchy (a single leader), aristocracy (a few leaders) and 
politeia (several leaders). If the power is exerted for one’s own interest, the forms of 
government are despotism (a single leader), oligarchy (a few leaders) and 
democracy (several leaders).  
Consequently, the type of interest (public or personal) is certain, the number 
of participants being only secondly important and only by comparison with the 
interest by reason of which leaders are governing.  
Just like Plato, Aristotle asserts that democracy is a corrupt form of 
government, because the demos aims at selfish interests as a consequence of its 
narrow perspectives. Simple people do not seem interested in the peace and stability 
of the polis (therefore they do not support long term interests), but they adjust 
according to their own short term interests, appropriating properties, fortunes and 
power from the few. These tendencies of demos result in the same consequences as 
those described by Plato: the establishment of chaos and  finally of despotism across 
the entire polis.  
An essential characteristic of Aristotle’s classification is that it includes 
politeia as a good government form exerted by the many.  
In the Stagirite’s opinion, politeia differs from democracy by the fact that it 
combines elements of government exerted by the many, resulting a mixed 
constitution which consists of the fact that each group can monitor the other, the few 
can control the many and vice-versa, so that neither of these social classes can fight 
for its own interest in the detriment of common welfare. This is a pre-figuration of 
what Montesquien becomes centuries later: «the effect of freedom» in mitigating 
power.  
                                                            
17   Plato, The Republic, book VIII 
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Another distinction between politeia and democracy suggested by Aristotle 
stems from the way of distribution of fortune and property. In democracy, under 
quasi-total and inevitable conditions, (this is the way things are and it cannot be 
changed), the many are the poor. Only in extremely rare cases the majority of the 
people are neither rich nor poor, but “they own a moderate and sufficient property 
(fortune)”18, existing the possibility that they may govern cautiously. We are thus 
witnessing the transformation of the middle class in the majority, which will lead to 
avoiding abuse specific to the envious poor and to the arrogant rich.  
The middle class considers that the welfare of the  polis is its own personal 
welfare and therefore will militate and proceed accordingly so as to maintain the 
peace and stability of the city-state. 
Hence, Aristotle considered politeia as being the best of the six regimes, 
while democracy was seen as being vicious. However, he argued that democracy is 
better than despotism and oligarchy (making a gradual comparison regarding the 
«perverted» forms of government), being that collective reason is better than that of 
any individual or small group, inclusively of a group of competent persons (no 
ordinary man has the capacity to reason correctly what is right or wrong, good or 
bad, beautiful or unbeautiful). This is as available as “a banquet with several 
participants is better than a dinner relying on a single pocket.”19 The second element 
that makes democracy “a smaller evil” than despotism and oligarchy is that the first 
one gives several men the possibility to actively participate in the citizen life, to 
govern and to be governed.  
Aristotle’s Ethics includes, in an initial form, a conception regarding the 
man’s natural rights, referring to rights granted to all the individuals by reason of 
their belonging to human species.  
The German philosopher Max Pohlenz grasps an essential idea: the Greeks’ 
history is the history of the evolution of their freedom. He starts from the idea that, 
the Greeks have manifested a tendency towards self-decision since ancient times, 
people being aware of their will, even if they submitted to gods. The opinion 
concerning freedom in Greek Antiquity originates in a very important judicial fact: 
that slavery makes the distinction between a free man and a slave, between freedom 
and dependence. Freedom makes sense within the private sphere, the perception of 
freedom characterized the master and his family. Pohlenz emphasizes that after the 
Persian Wars the Greek consciousness clearly perceived freedom, which was 
provided by nomos, by the Greek law. Political freedom proper begins with the polis, 
                                                            
18  Aristotle, Politics, Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p.192. 
19  Ibidem, p.146. 
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with state autonomy, with the right of citizens to participate in decision making within a 
limited area. Being the result of the warfare for state freedom, the notion of freedom gets 
a special connotation with the Greeks: it is something different from despotism. The 
situation of the Spartan citizen includes an element of high specificity: for him freedom 
means nothing more than the military freedom of the polis. 20 
Greek political freedom is a historical fact of life, especially a result of war. 
Exactly during the period of the development of classical political freedom there can be 
remarked a distinction between freedom characterized by adherence to sophrosyne 
(respect for tradition and existence) for social life, order and discipline, on the one hand, 
and to democratic freedom understood as libertinism, licentiousness, akalasia, on the 
other. The latter determines arrogance and hybris, dissolution and instability in and for 
community life. Besides, in his Testament Pericles warned about the danger that the 
second form of freedom represented for the state, highlighting that freedom without 
lawfulness (without submission to authorities) does not exist, and if it exists, it 
represents a capital deviation from eleutheria (community) towards a demos ruled  by 
unlawfulness, by anarchy.  
Such aspects are significant for understanding and determining Plato and 
Aristotle’s position regarding freedom. They both use the term of freedom reticently 
because this term has an overly political weight. In fact they developed the concept, 
which acquired a philosophical precision: interior freedom reaches plenitude in the 
freedom of spirit, which not only guarantees man’s independence in relation to the 
exterior world, but it also gives him the possibility to develop his real character. 
Freedom has only one limit, but it is inviolable. It derives from the intrinsic laws of the 
spirit, which are able to provide truth as well as good.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I presented a series of ideas that are circumscribed to some values on which 
ancient Greek philosophy is based and which are reflected in the modern era, even 
though the historical context requires new approaches. To them there can be added many 
others – all of them aiming at a vector with a rich cognitive weight – an axiological one. 
And as a last remark: the matrix of the small city-state that R. Dahl mentions when 
insisting upon the historical coordinate of the idea of democracy is a model that 
subsequent civilizations aspired after, the city representing a way of life compatible with 
human nature and condition. 
 
                                                            
20  See Kurt von Fritz, Conservative Reaction and One Man Rule in Ancient Greece, 
in Political Science Quaterly, Volume Fifty-six, Academy of Political Science Columbia 
University, New York, 1941. 
